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INTRODUCTION
On February 4, 2010, Shaun Donovan, the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), announced HUD's
creation of the Office of Sustainable Housing and Communities (the "Office").2 Given the rather depressing state of the U.S. housing market, the
announcement was one bright spot on an otherwise dim horizon for U.S.
housing policy. The new Office is a program within HUD "designed to
help build stronger, more sustainable communities by connecting housing
to jobs, fostering local innovation and building a clean energy economy." 3
Through the Office, HUD seeks "to tie the quality and location of housing
to broader opportunities such as access to good jobs, quality schools and
safe streets." 4 Congress funded the Office in the FY 2010 Consolidated
Appropriations Act,5 and allocated $150 million to the Office for a Sustainable Communities Initiative (the "Initiative").6

2. Press Release, Andrea Mead, U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., HUD Secretary
Donovan Announces New Office of Sustainable Housing and Communities (Feb. 4, 2010),
available at http://portal.hud.gov:80/hudportal/HUD?src=/press/pressreleasesmediaadvi
sories/2010/HUDNo. 10-028.

3. Id.
4. Id
5. FY 2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 111-117, 123 Stat. 3034

(2009).
6. U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., FACT SHEET ON HUD's SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITmES REGIONAL PLANNING GRANT PROGRAM (2010) [hereinafter FACT SHEET], available

at http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=regionalNOFA.pdf.
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7
Instead of a reactive attempt to correct U.S. housing policy's failures,
the Initiative is HUD's affirmative act "to stimulate more integrated and
sophisticated regional planning to guide state, metropolitan, and local investments in land use, transportation and housing, as well as to challenge
localities to undertake zoning and land use reforms." 8 The Initiative is one
effort of the Obama Administration's broader Interagency Partnership for
Sustainable Communities (the "Partnership"). The Partnership is a joint
endeavor between HUD, the U.S. Department of Transportation, and the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, to foster interagency coordination
and cooperation around interdependent challenges. 9 The Partnership identified six livability principles that each agency member of the Partnership
will incorporate into its programming. The principles are to: (1) provide
more transportation choices; (2) promote equitable, affordable housing; (3)
enhance economic competitiveness; (4) support existing communities; (5)
coordinate policies and leverage investments; and (6) value communities
and neighborhoods. 10 The Initiative is one HUD program designed to advance these livability principles.
One hundred million dollars of the Initiative's funding is for a competitive Sustainable Communities Regional Planning Grant Program (the
"Grant Program")." Through the competitive Grant Program, HUD pro-

7. Rightfully, most of the other articles from this Colloquium focus on legal solutions
to the aftermath of the subprime mortgage crisis and the current foreclosure crisis. See generally Susan Block-Lieb & Edward J. Janger, Reforming Regulation in the Markets for
Home Loans, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 681 (2011); David A. Dana, A Simple Approach to
Preventing the Next Housing Crisis-Why We Need One, What One Would Look Like, and
Why Dodd-Frank Isn't It, 38 FORDHAM URB.L.J. 721 (2011); Anna Gelpem, FinancialStability is a Volume Business: A Comment on the Legal Infrastructureof Ex Post Consumer
Debtor Protections,38 FORDUAm URB. L.J. 767 (2011); Robin S. Golden, Building Policy
Through CollaborativeDeliberation:A Reflection on Using Lessons From Practice to Inform Responses to the Mortgage Foreclosure Crisis, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 733 (2011);
Melissa B. Jacoby, The Legal Infrastructure of Ex Post Consumer Debtor Protections, 38
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 751 (2011). Since legal scholars from this Colloquium and elsewhere
are generating beneficial legal solutions to these problems, this Article instead analyzes the
efficacy of affirmative attempts to devise long-range solutions to the problems of regionalism before those problems culminate in a crisis.
8. Sustainable Housing and Communities, U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV.,
http://portal.hud.gov/portal/page/porta/HUD/program-offices/sustainable-housing commu
nities (last visited Mar. 8, 2011).
9. See FACT SHEET, supra note 6.
10. U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., FR-5396-N-03, NOTICE OF FUNDING AVAILABILITY (NOFA) FOR HUD's FISCAL YEAR 2010 SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES REGIONAL
PLANNING GRANT PROGRAM 3-4 (2010) [hereinafter NOTICE OF FUNDING AVAILABILITY],

available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/adm/grants/nofalO/scrpgsec.pdf.

11. See id at 5. Ninety-eight million dollars of the one hundred million dollar total is
available for competitive grants. The remaining two million is reserved for capacity support
grants.
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vides financial incentives to metropolitan and rural grant applicants to
create regional plans "that integrate housing, land use, economic and workforce development, transportation, and infrastructure investments.' 2 The
Grant Program places a priority on funding projects that "translate the livability principles" into long-term strategies to address issues of regional significance.' 3 The Grant Program's unique targeting of regions as sites for
regulatory reform, as well as its multijurisdictional and multisectoral emphasis, make it an example of what scholars and policymakers call "New
4
Regionalism."']
New regionalism has been defined as "any attempt to develop regional
governance structures or interlocal cooperative agreements that better distribute regional benefits and burdens."' 15 New regionalist approaches recognize regions as key sites for the resolution of contemporary, interrelated
problems that transcend local government and state boundaries. New regionalism includes collaborative efforts between cities and outlying suburbs to resolve metropolitan challenges such as affordable housing creation, transportation, sprawl, water access, infrastructure development, or
environmental regulation. 16 The new regionalist agenda supports normative goals similar to the objectives that local government law seeks to advance, including: (1) equity and inclusion within, and amongst, self-defined
territorial communities; (2) democratic participation; and (3) efficient and

12. Id.at 1.
13. Id.at 3.
14. See, e.g., Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored
Quarter:Addressing the Barriersto New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985, 2028 (2000) (defining the term "new regionalism"); Laurie Reynolds, IntergovernmentalCooperation,MetropolitanEquity and the New Regionalism, 78 WASH. L. REv. 93, 100-19 (2003); David D.
Troutt, Katrina's Window: Localism, Resegregation, and Equitable Regionalism, 55 BUFF.

L. REv. 1109 (2008) (calling new regionalist attempts at metropolitan-wide governance and
land use "equitable regionalism"); see also ANTHONY DOWNS, NEW VISIONS FOR METROPOL-

ITAN AMERICA 170-82 (1994) (describing new approaches to resolving regional challenges);

MYRON ORFIELD, METROPOLITICS: A REGIONAL AGENDA FOR COMMUNITY AND STABILITY

12-13 (1997) (describing Minnesota's experience with voluntary regional collaboration);
NEAL R. PEIRCE ET AL., CITISTATES: How URBAN AMERICA CAN PROSPER IN A COMPETITIVE

WORLD 34 (1993) (describing the benefits of new attempts at regionalism); DAVID RUSK,
CITIES WITIOUT SUBURBS 85-130 (1993) [hereinafter RUSK, CITEs/SUBuRBs] (describing
new strategies for addressing regional problems); DAvID RUSK, INSIDE/OUTSIDE GAME:
WINNING STRATEGIES FOR URBAN

AMERICA

153-335 (1999)

[hereinafter RUSK, IN-

SIDE/OUTSIDE GAME] (describing multiple examples of new regionalism).
15. Cashin, supra note 14 (using interlocal as a term of art to describe agreements between localities).
16. See Troutt, supra note 14.
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accountable government. 17 Yet, new regionalists accept that new regulatory formulations and institutional collaborations are necessary to advance
their objectives under contemporary conditions. New regionalism embraces a broad range of institutional arrangements and regulatory formations
that privilege the well-being of the region as a whole, rather than the best
interests of any one locality within a region. 18 New regionalism is a law
reform strategy that responds to local government law's failure to: (1) resolve cross-border, multi-issue challenges; (2) promote regional equity
amongst interdependent localities; and (3) foster participation and collaboration across local boundaries.
This Article examines the Obama Administration's Sustainable Communities Regional Planning Grant Program as an example of new regionalism. The Grant Program is not an example of formal regional governance
or mandated regulation. It provides federal economic incentives to encourage multiple jurisdictions to collaborate and to devise solutions to longstanding regional problems. The Grant Program, thus, signals a new era of
federal/regional governance relations that is reminiscent of the Great Society programs of the 1960s. Yet, the Grant Program differs from those prior
efforts in that its institutional design reflects newer approaches to governance and regulatory reform. Specifically, the Grant Program's efforts to
incentivize voluntary forms of participation and collaboration between
multijurisdictional stakeholders, devolve planning functions to regional,
public/private partnerships that include traditionally marginalized groups,
and monitor outcomes to ascertain best practices, make it an example of
what many scholars have called, "new governance" or "democratic experimentalism."' 9

17. See Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan
Areas, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1115, 1124 (1996) (discussing some of the normative goals of local
government law).
18. See Cashin, supra note 14, at 2027-28 (describing various categories and types of
new regionalist governance); see also Troutt, supra note 14 (referring to new regionalism as
equitable regionalism and describing and explaining that equitable regionalism "recognizes
that issues with distinct equity implications should be susceptible to regional cooperation
because they are typically the subject of localist opposition").
19. See, e.g., Griinne de Bfirca & Joanne Scott, Introduction: New Governance, Law
and Constitutionalism, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE INTHE EU AND US 2 (GrAinne de
Bfirca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006) (describing new governance as "a range of processes and
practices that have a normative dimension but do not operate primarily or at all through the
formal mechanism of traditional command and control type regulation"); Michael C. Dorf &
Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLuM. L. REv. 267
(1998) (describing democratic experimentalism as decentralized governance which enables
citizens and other groups to utilize their local knowledge to devise local solutions to their
problems while regional or national coordinating bodies encourage such actors to share their
knowledge with each other); Cristie Ford, New Governance in the Teeth of Human Frailty:
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Though the term "new governance" defies precise definition, scholars
generally agree that the emphasis on governance signals "a shift away from
the monopoly of traditional politico-legal institutions, and implies either
the involvement of actors other than classically governmental actors, or indeed the absence of any traditional framework of government.- 2' New govemance also connotes a retreat from formal regulation; whereby bureaucratic elites impose rigid mandates in a top-down manner on the
governed. 2' Instead, governmental entities merely identify broad goals and
structure economic incentives to encourage collaborators to pursue those
goals. New governance strategies also privilege the participation of nontraditional, or even marginalized, stakeholders in public problem-solving.22
Proponents of new governance assert that despite the absence of formal
rules, mandates, and government control, all relevant public and private
stakeholders in a given problem-solving network will often cooperate, irrespective of their power or status, to resolve public problems in a socially
optimal and equitable manner. 23 They argue that informal public/private
partnerships containing multiple stakeholders may be preferable to bureaucratic agencies when resolving complex public problems. Strict rules, regulations, and mandates are viewed as unnecessary to ensure regulatory accountability, if the gravity, enormity, urgency, and uncertainty of the public
problem facing the stakeholder network make collaboration and cooperaLessons from FinancialRegulation, 2010 Wis. L. REV. 441; Jody Freeman, Collaborative
Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1997); Katherine R. Kruse,
InstitutingInnocence Reform: Wisconsin 's New GovernanceExperiment, 2006 Wis. L. REV.
645; Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN.L. REV. 343 (2004); Lester M. Salamon, The New
Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An Introduction, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1611
(2001); Joanne Scott & Susan Sturm, Courts as Catalysts: Rethinking the JudicialRole in
New Governance, 13 COLUM. J. EuR. L. 565 (2007); Louise Trubek, New Governance and
Soft Law in Health Care Reform, 3 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 137, 145 (2006); Michael Wilkinson, Three Conceptions of Law: Towards a Jurisprudenceof Democratic Experimentalism,
2010 Wis. L. REV. 673.

20. de Bfirca & Scott, supra note 19 (a compilation of scholarly articles on new governance in the U.S. and the E.U.).
21. See Lobel, supra note 19.
22. See, e.g., Lisa T. Alexander, Stakeholder Participationin New Governance:Lessons
From Chicago's Public Housing Reform Experiment, 116 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y
117 (2009).

23. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 19, at 22 (describing collaborative governance as including the participation of parties who are interdependent and accountable to each other as
as well as involved at all stages of the deliberative process); Trubek, supra note 19, at 141
(describing collaborative health care collaborations including multiple types of stakeholders); Orly Lobel, Rethinking Traditional Alignments: Privatizationand ParticipatoryCitizenship, in PROGRESSIVE LAWYERING, GLOBALIZATION AND MARKETS: RETHINKING IDEOLOGY AND STRATEGY 1,5 (Clare Dalton ed., 2007) (describing successful public/private

collaborations in a variety of fields).
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tion necessary for resolution of the challenge. Further, the informal nature
of new governance's collaborative networks allows stakeholder collaborations to identify provisional goals, and then change those goals in response
also places lawyers in less
to new information. 24 New governance practice
25
confrontational and more collaborative roles.
New governance supporters assert that such approaches enhance the legitimacy, accountability, and transparency of regulatory reform as well as
increase its experimental and democratic nature.26 Most importantly, new
governance scholars and advocates claim that such approaches to regulatory reform, if properly implemented, will often lead to more equitable distributive outcomes. 27 While many scholars maintain that new governance
approaches provide many reasons for optimism, several others have shown
that such approaches can present substantial pitfalls for traditionally marginalized stakeholders pursing distributive justice through regulatory
reform.28 This Article examines both the promise and perils of the Sustainable Communities Regional Planning Grant Program as an example of new
regionalism as new governance. Part I outlines new regionalism's response
to the failures of local government law. Part II explains how new regionalism is in fact a form of new governance practice, and thus reflects the
promise and perils of new governance approaches. Part III examines the
regulatory architecture of the Sustainable Communities Regional Planning
Grant Program and outlines the Grant Program's potential strengths. Part
IV analyzes the Grant Program's potential weaknesses for advancing distributive justice in regional reform using the case of the Madison, Wiscon-

24. See Kruse, supra note 19, at 677.
25. See, e.g., Orly Lobel, Lawyering Loyalties: Speech Rights and Duties Within Twenty-First Century New Governance, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1245 (2009); Susan Sturm, Law-

yers and the Practice of Workplace Equity, 2002 Wis. L. REV. 277; Louise G. Trubek, Public Interest Lawyers and New Governance Advocatingfor Health Care, 2002 Wis. L. REV.
573.
26. Some of the seminal works in new governance theory and practice which make this
assertion include: de Biirca & Scott, supra note 19; Dorf & Sabel, supra note 19; Freeman,
supra note 19; Lobel, supra note 19; William H. Simon, Toyota Jurisprudence: Legal
Theory and Rolling Rule Regimes, in LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 503 (2008).
27. See Grdinne de Bfirca, New Governance and Experimentalism: An Introduction,
2010 Wis. L. REV. 227, 238 (explaining that an "empirical overview of the scholarly field
might well suggest that most new governance scholars themselves subscribe to a theory of
distributive justice and conceive of experimentalist governance as one way of realizing
this").
28. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 22; Wendy A. Bach, Governance, Accountability,
and the New Poverty Agenda, 2010 Wis. L. REV. 239; Douglas NeJaime, When New Governance Fails,70 OHIO ST. L.J. 323, 348-49 (2009); David A. Super, Laboratoriesof Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism and the Failure of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV.
541 (2008).
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sin/Dane County regional area. Finally, the Article concludes by outlining
the implications of these observations for new regionalist and new governance practice.
I. NEW REGIONALISM'S RESPONSE TO THE FAILURES OF LOCAL
GOVERNMENT LAW

A.

Cross-Border, Multi-Issue Challenges

As local government law scholars have demonstrated, the contemporary
reality of increasing metropolitanization creates problems for traditional local government law. 29 The term metropolitanization describes the interrelationship between "urban cores and suburban peripheries."3 ° Suburbanization-the migration of people from cities to suburbs-is the defining
trend in the recent history of U.S. metropolitanization. 3 1 Increasing suburbanization from the 1960s to the present has led to the creation of multiple
incorporated local jurisdictions. 32 Those multiple suburban municipalities
were created because major metropolitan cities resisted annexing the growing suburbs, and because incorporation allowed localities to control their
fiscal, taxing, and social powers to attract low cost, high-earning individuals and to exclude undesirables.33 While small, suburban municipalities
proliferate, the U.S. population increasingly lives in large, sprawling, economically interdependent, metropolitan areas-including cities and suburbs-rather than the geographically distinct and isolated areas that an incorporated municipality traditionally connotes.34 Studies have shown that
by the year 2000, "nearly one-third of Americans lived in the ten largest
35
metropolitan areas."
As a result of increasing metropolitanization, residents of a particular locality may conduct their activities outside of the locality in which they re-

29. See Briffault, supra note 17, at 1115-17 ("The governance of metropolitan areas is
the central problem for local governance law today."); see also Cashin, supra note 14, at
1991-92.
30. BERNADETTE HANLON, JOHN RENNIE SHORT & THOMAS J. VICINO, CITIES AND SUBURBS: NEW METROPOLITAN REALITIES INTHE US 6 (2010).
31. Seeid. at37.
32. See Cashin, supra note 14, at 1992.
33. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 17, at 1136; see also Cashin, supra note 14, at 199193.
34. See Briffault, supra note 17, at 1116.
35. HANLON, SHORT & VICINO, supra note 30, at 5. The 2010 Census may reveal even
more significant metropolitanization, yet this data has not been fully analyzed at the printing
of this Article.
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side, but within the broader metropolitan region. 36 Cities and suburbs,
within and across state lines, may be economically and socially interdependent.37 Under these conditions, local municipal actions inevitably have
cross-border effects. 38 The decisions of a particular locality to exclude or
include certain land uses, or to provide public subsidies for housing construction or economic development, will inevitably generate externalities or
have spillover effects on neighboring localities. 39 Additionally, the actions
of one locality acting alone to resolve housing or economic development
challenges may be inadequate to resolve the regional scope of the problem.
Further, if most suburban localities within a metropolitan region exercise
their own local zoning powers to exclude affordable housing, then the aggregate effects of several localities' actions may put severe burdens on the
central city. 40 Thus, the interdependence of localities within a particular
region and the cross-border effects of their decisions suggest that regional,
rather than local or state, regulation and cooperation may be necessary to
resolve problems the effects of which transcend traditional local boundaries. 41
Many public policy challenges are also substantively integrated. For example, improving the quality of life for low-income public housing residents cannot be achieved by reforming housing structures alone. 42 If one
locality seeks to reform public housing without examining the entire regional job market, that locality's action or inaction may affect neighboring
localities within the region. Public housing residents in improved housing,
but without any meaningful access to local employment, may have significant commutes to work or may need transportation to a neighboring locality within the region to find work. Reformers must acknowledge the interrelated, multi-issue character of metropolitan problems and devise
36. See Briffault, supra note 17, at 1116-17.
37. See HANLON, SHORT & VICINO, supra note 30, at 3 (explaining that the northern
counties of Virginia, a once "predominately rural ... small town state," have become part of
the "metropolitan orbit of Washington DC" as incomers to the region working in DC have
moved out to the Virginia suburbs).
38. See Briffault, supra note 17, at 1133 (defining cross-border effects).
39. See id.; see also ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAW IN A MARKET CONTEXT: AN INTRODUCTION TO MARKET CONCEPTS IN LEGAL REASONING 117 (2004) (defining externalities and
spillover effects as costs imposed on others external to a transaction because all the costs of
the exchange cannot be fully internalized by the primary parties to the action).
40. See Briffault, supra note 17, at 1134.
41. See Troutt, supra note 14, at 1172.
42. See Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, White House Office of Mgmt. & Budget,
et al., to the Heads of Exec. Dep'ts and Agencies, Developing Effective Place-Based Policies for the FY 2012 Budget 6 (June 21, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/default/files/omb/assets/memoranda_2010/m10-21.pdf (describing the federal government's efforts to coordinate public housing reform with educational and crime reforms).
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coordinated solutions throughout a given region. Thus, local government
law's tendency to encourage discrete, single-issue, regulatory responses
prevents the regional resolution of substantively integrated problems.
B.

Equitable Regionalism

Local government law structures often preclude the equitable resolution
of regional problems.4 3 Equity, as used here, includes equal access to opportunity, the "fair and just inclusion' 44 of all relevant stakeholders in a
given reform project, and "distributive justice," defined as an equitable distribution of the benefits and burdens of reform. Supporters of new regionalism assert that by normalizing the self-interested, local decisions of municipalities, particularly suburban municipalities with exclusionary
tendencies, the traditional structure of local government law exacerbates
interlocal fiscal disparities and undermines regional equity and collaboration.45 The local autonomy over land use and fiscal decisions that local
government law affords municipalities was justified when localities were
separated by significant unincorporated land, and before transportation and
job patterns connected formerly distinct geographic areas. 46 Yet, under
contemporary conditions, restricting local autonomy to a broad range of
small local governments with control over discrete, but economically and
socially interdependent territories, leads to fragmented local land use deci47
sions, systemic exclusion, and distributional inequities.
Not surprisingly, these effects of local government law operate along racial as well as economic lines.4 8 Race is often the preeminent determinant
of locational choice.49 Citizens may move to a particular suburban locality
primarily because of the race of its residents, rather than its mere "mix of
services and taxes." 50 Thus, municipalities acting in their economic self43. See Briffault, supra note 17, at 1115, 1140.
44. Angela Glover Blackwell, Equitable Development, in BUILDING HEALTHY COMMUNITIES: A GUIDE TO COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FOR ADVOCATES, LAWYERS AND

POLICYMAKERS 179 (Roger A. Clay, Jr. & Susan R. Jones eds., 2009).
45. See Briffault, supra note 17; see also Cashin supra note 14, at 1988.
46. See Briffault, supra note 17, at 1133.
47. See, e.g., id. at 1135-37; Cashin, supra note 14, at 1993.
48. Cashin, supra note 14, at 1993-94.
49. See Lee Ann Fennell, Exclusion's Attraction: Land Use Controls in Tieboutian
Perspective, in TIEBOUT MODEL AT FIFTY: ESSAYS IN PUBLIC ECONOMICS IN HONOR OF WALLACE OATES 163 (William Fischel ed. 2006) (explaining that Tiebout's hypothesis casts "citizens as consumers who vote with their feet for particular metropolitan areas"); see also Cashin, supra note 14, at 1994 ("[A]nd the recent empirical literature on locational choice
suggests that race, as opposed to the mix of services and taxes a jurisdiction offers, is the
strongest of the factors that influence locational decisions." (alteration to the original)).
50. See Cashin, supra note 14, at 1193-94.
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interest have incentives to use their zoning, land use, taxing, and development powers to exclude undesirables, as determined primarily by an intersecting mix of racial and class factors. Local government law, therefore,
normalizes and entrenches citizens' private, market-based, racial, and economic preferences, which exacerbates spatial and social inequity. 1
As Professor Sheryll Cashin demonstrated, these dynamics often lead to
a "tyranny of the favored quarter."5 2 Since most metropolitan regions in
the United States consist of central cities, inner-ring suburbs, and outlying
exurbs,53 localism has led to outer suburban rings that have rapid growth
and obtain a disproportionate share of metropolitan public investments,
such as new roads, highways, transportation systems, developmental infrastructure, and water sewer services.54 The favored quarter reaps the bene55
fits of development, but externalizes development's costs and burdens.
The phenomenon of the favored quarter also contributes to the continued
racialization of space and allocation of benefits along racial lines. To the
extent that the favored quarter is disproportionately white and a disproportionate allocation of subsidies to spur development are allocated to such
quarters, the benefits and burdens of development are unevenly distributed
throughout a region in a manner that maintains the existing order of white
racial hierarchy.
Additionally, while outer-ring, affluent, and disproportionately white
suburbs and exurbs tend to comprise "the favored quarter,"56 the modern
metropolis increasingly reflects other more complicated housing patterns
and spatial relations that defy the traditional black/white divide between cities and suburbs. 57 As scholars have noted, the new metropolitan reality
also reflects interrelated geographic territories with "heterogeneous and segregated communities, immigrant gateways, minority suburbs, middle-class
America suburbs, Black-middle class suburbs," and great disparities be-

51. See id.
52. Id. at 2003.
53. The term "exurbs" describes "a region or settlement that lies outside of a city and
usually beyond its suburbs and that often is inhabited chiefly by well-to-do families." Exurbs, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/exurb
(last visited Mar. 1, 2011).
54. See Cashin, supra note 14, at 2003 (citing MYRON ORFIELD, METROPOLITICS: A REGIONAL AGENDA FOR COMMUNITY AND STABILITY 2-8 (1997)).

55. See id. at 2004.
56. SHERYLL D. CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION: How RACE AND CLASS ARE
UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN DREAM 170 (2005) [hereinafter CASHIN, FAILURES].

57. See HANLON, SHORT & VICINO, supra note 30, at 106; see also John A. Powell, Reflection on the Past, Looking to the Future: The FairHousing Act at 40, 41 IND. L. REv. 605,
608-12 (2008).
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tween rich and poor within each formation.5" In these more complex metropolitan environments, localism may further exacerbate even more complicated racial and socioeconomic fissures and inequities.
C.

Political Participation and Collaboration Across Local Boundaries

Lastly, local government law's narrow focus on discrete geographic
communities engenders a kind of nativism amongst residents of localities
that precludes the pursuit of cross-border political alliances or multi-racial,
multi-ethnic, or socio-economic diversity. As Professor Cashin also explains, localism tends to "institutionalize societal attitudes that, in turn,
reinforce existing disparities of power, wealth and social access., 59 Thus,
the existence of the favored quarter, and its racial and socioeconomic dynamics, appear to be the result of an otherwise race-neutral order. The role
of government policy and subsidies in structuring and reinforcing private
market forces is obscured, and the existing hierarchical racial and economic
order is viewed by citizens as "natural." Therefore, residents of the favored
quarter approve of zoning board denials, low-density development, referendums, and other actions that maintain the existence of the favored quarter, while remaining na'fve about the structural racial character of their decisions. Residents may also fail to support local or state public policies or
regulations that will more equitably redistribute resources throughout a region because of a failure to see how other more equitable possibilities are
in the region's collective self-interest.
As Professor Briffault argues, local residents tend to be oblivious to interlocal, economic interdependence. 60 Yet, localities within a large metropolitan area "tend to rise and fall together." 6 1 Studies have shown "a high
correlation between city and suburban growth in employment, income, and
population." 62 The health of central cities tends to influence citizens' perceptions of the region as a whole and somewhat determines the region's
ability to attract jobs, tourists, and other drivers of economic growth. 63 The
interdependence of localities throughout a region exists beyond the central
city/suburb relationship. Compact suburban commercial sites, often known
as "edge cities," also recruit workers from throughout the region.' To the

supra note 30, at 106.
59. Cashin, supra note 14, at 2026.
60. See Briffault, supra note 17, at 1149.
61. Id. at 1139.
62. Id.at 1138 (quoting Richard Voith, City & Suburban Growth: Substitutes or Complements?, FED. RES. BANK PHILA. Bus. REv., Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 21, 29).
63. Id. at 1139.
64. Id.at 1140.
58. HANLON, SHORT & VICINO,
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extent that some localities within a region suffer from high crime, poor
may aleducational systems, and the like, those dynamics in such localities
65
region.
the
within
localities
affluent
so affect neighboring and
The existence of multiple local boundaries within a region can also undermine regional collective action and coalition-building amongst members
of traditionally disadvantaged groups. Scholars in the field of housing and
66
community development law note the "limitations of localism" increating multi-racial, multi-ethnic, socio-economically diverse coalitions with
common interests. 67 They urge advocates and community members in
search of distributive justice to "look beyond community boundaries to a
more comprehensive antipoverty approach that acknowledges the significregional and transnational networks in the process of economic
ance of 68
reform."
The aforementioned shortcomings of local government law illustrate
that, given the new metropolitan realities, traditional, local government
law's unfettered local autonomy and focus on small geographic territories
thwarts the actual realization of equity, community, participation, and collective action within the region. These are the normative values that local
government law is designed to advance. 69 Yet, local government law, in
practice, operates to undermine those values under contemporary conditions. New regionalism attempts to respond to such limitations of local
government law by offering new territorial, regulatory, and political
frameworks to resolve intractable public problems.
II. "NEW REGIONALISM" AS "NEW GOVERNANCE"

A.

The Retreat From Regional Governments

Notably, most proponents of new regionalism do not call for the creation
of formal, general purpose regional governments to resolve regional problems. Their resistance stems from the history of unsuccessful attempts to
create general purpose regional governments.70 While the concept of "regional governments" in the United States dates back to the nineteenth cen-

65. See id.
66. Scott L. Cummings, Community Economic Development as Progressive Politics:
Toward a GrassrootsMovement for Economic Justice, 54 STAN. L. REv. 399, 456 (2001).

67. See id.at 399.
68. Id. at 456.
69. See Cashin, supra note 14, at 1998.
70. See id.at 1989 n. 11 (citing JOHN J.HARRIGAN, POLITICAL CHANGE INTHE METROPOLIS 342-65 (1993)).
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tury, the rise of regional regulatory formations in the modem era stems
from U.S. federal grants programs in the areas of housing, transit, and urban development in the 1960s and 1970s. 72 The U.S. Federal-Aid Highway
Act of 1962 required that urban areas form metropolitan bodies for transportation planning as a condition of receiving federal funding for interstate
highway construction. 73 Specifically, the Housing and Urban Development
Act of 1965 mandated the creation of organizations composed of public officials whom HUD found to be "representative of the various political jurisdictions within a metropolitan urban area.",74 This provision encouraged
the creation of elected regional councils of government ("COGs") and metropolitan planning organizations ("MPOs"). 75 These regional bodies were
originally composed of publicly elected officials.76 Yet, in the 1980s, the
Reagan Administration dismantled many of the federal programs that required metropolitan regional review and abandoned regional review requirements as a condition of federal funding. 77 Thus, the creation of formally elected regional councils dwindled and the new MPOs that were
created consisted largely of appointed or voluntary members.7 8 Such bodies also lost their central planning and formal governance function.79
While metropolitan transportation planning still occurs, such planning bodies do not perform significant regional land use planning functions. 80
Additionally, court ordered attempts to mandate regional cooperation
have also been largely unsuccessful. In the 1970s, the U.S. Supreme Court
began its retreat from the civil rights movement victories of the 1950s and
1960s, sanctioning localities' exclusionary zoning powers even though
such actions had deleterious effects on regional equity and integration.8 '
Further, in the few cases that did mandate, through consent decrees, regional action as a remedy for past discrimination, local, predominately
white residents staunchly resisted efforts to include formerly excluded pop-

71. Briffault, supra note 17, at 1117.
72. See id. at 1148.
73. See Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962, Pub. L. 87-866, 76 Stat. 1145; see also
About MPOs: A BriefHistory, AMPO, http://www.ampo.org/content/index.php?pid=15 [hereinafter About MiPOs] (last visited Mar. 1, 2011).
74. See About MPOs, supra note 73.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See Briffault, supra note 17, at 1148.
78. About MPOs,supra note 73.
79. See Briffault, supra note 17, at 1148; see also About MPOs, supra note 73.
80. See Cashin, supra note 14, at 2029-30.
81. Troutt, supra note 14, at 1147-48.
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ulations or redistribute resources throughout the region.8 2 Consequently,
while some supporters of new regionalism still advocate for "regionally
bounded governments to address matters of regional significance," 83 many
"the political futility of seeking
new regionalists have reluctantly accepted
84
government."
regional
consolidated
B.

Regional Governance and Stakeholder Collaboration Dilemmas

New regionalists support the creation of limited-purpose metropolitan
governments, interlocal cooperative agreements, or other more informal
and voluntary regional collaborations. 85 New regionalism is, thus, a reform
movement that is distinct from older efforts to foster general purpose regional governments that supplant local authority. 86 Instead, new regionalist
approaches emphasize voluntary interlocal collaboration to resolve fiscal
disparities and distributional inequities. 87 New regionalism, then, is also a
form of "new governance." Similar to new regionalism, the primary normative goals of new governance are to: (1) develop regulatory arrangements to facilitate democratic participation and experimentalism; 88 (2)
promote efficiency, 89 problem-solving, and accountability9" in regulatory
reform; and (3) enhance distributive justice. Yet, a growing number of
scholars express skepticism and concern about the ability of new governance methods to fulfill these goals, particularly when traditionally margicollaboration with more economically and sonalized stakeholders are in
91
groups.
empowered
cially
In my Article, Stakeholder Participationin New Governance: Lessons
From Chicago's Public Housing Reform Experiment, I outline three common power dilemmas that often affect the participation of marginalized
92
stakeholders in informal, public/private urban reform collaborations.
82. See id.; see also ALEXANDER POLIKOFF, WAITING FOR GAUTREAUX: A STORY OF SEGREGATION HOUSING AND THE BLACK GHETTO 161-62 (2006).
83. Briffault, supra note 17, at 1115.
84. Cashin, supra note 14, at 2027.
85. See, e.g., Cashin, supra note 14, at 2028; Troutt, supranote 14, at 1173.
86. See Cashin, supra note 14, at 2027 ("The New Regionalist agenda accepts the political futility of seeking consolidated regional government. Instead, it attempts to bridge met); see also
ropolitan social and fiscal inequities with regional governance structures ....
Note, Old Regionalism, New Regionalism, and Envision Utah: Making Regionalism Work,

118 H
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Rv. L. REV. 2291, 2292 (2005).
Cashin, supra note 14, at 2027; Note, supra note 86.
See generally Dorf& Sabel, supra note 19, at 267.
Lobel, supra note 19, at 344.
Freeman, supra note 19, at 22.
See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 22; Bach, supra note 28; NeJaime, supra note 28.
See Alexander, supra note 22, at 135-42; see also NeJaime, supra note 28.
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First is the problem of demographic representation.9 3 This occurs when it
appears that the right stakeholder representative-an organization or an individual who will advocate for, and advance, the interests of traditionally
marginalized stakeholders-has been identified because the representative's racial, gender, or socio-economic characteristics are similar to those
of the group that he, she, or it purports to represent. 94 Despite this seeming
alignment of demographic characteristics, however, such representatives
may have competing allegiances to other groups because of multiple and
rival identity characteristics (i.e., class over race, gender over class, socioeconomics over race, etc.). 95 Thus, demographic representation does not
always result in meaningful representative governance. Rather, it can lead
to false representation. In such instances, organizations or individuals that
appear to be representative of traditionally marginalized or disempowered
stakeholders' interests may be present in the collaborative network, but in
practice they may actually intentionally further the interests of other, more
empowered groups within the network because of competing allegiances. 96
Second is the related problem of representative opportunism. Even
when a well-meaning, demographically or ideologically aligned representative participates in new governance's informal, public/private partnerships,
motivated by both social and profit making goals, the representative may
act opportunistically to pursue his or her own selfish ends. 97 Both individual and organizational representatives can exhibit such opportunism. Like
individuals, organizations depend on their environment for power and status as well as financial resources. 98 Both organizations and individuals can
be easily seduced by individual or organizational network participants with
more money, power, or status.99 Such individuals and organizations may
be dependent upon the private interests in a given network for financial
support as well as positive social reputation or social capital.'
These rep-

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

See Alexander, supra note 22, at 137-39.
See id.at 138.
See id.
See id. at 157-58.
See id. at 139-41.

98. JOEL F. HANDLER, DOWN FROM BUREAUCRACY: THE AMBIGUITY OF PRIVATIZATION

AND EMPOWERMENT 20 (1996).
99. See id. at 20-2 1; see also Alexander, supra note 22, at 139-41.
100. Social Capital theorists assert that individuals' and organizations' "social networks
have value." ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMER-

ICAN COMMUNITY 7 (2000). Even non-profit or socially oriented organizations may depend
upon the private interests in a given network for positive social capital that validates and
legitimizes the organization to other network participants. This social validation can also
lead to increased financial resources or social opportunities. See HANDLER, supra note 98, at
20-21.
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resentatives may receive promises or enticements from network participants with more status, such as collaboration on future development
projects, choice units in newly designed housing, and financial inducements that lure the representatives to support positions that further the interests of more dominant stakeholders within the collaborative network.'l 0
Such representatives may do so to further their own individual or organiza10 2
tional interests, rather than the long-term interests of their constituents.
In this instance, it is opportunism, rather than competing identity characteto betray the interests of
ristics, that can lead stakeholder representatives
03
the groups they purport to represent.1
The third dilemma, representative acquiescence, "occurs when stakeholder representatives unwittingly articulate their needs, and those of their
constituents, in terms that reflect the dominant narratives of urban reform,
rather than demand concessions that will lead to the long-term empowerment of their constituents."' 0 4 When this dilemma occurs, the representative is not consciously acting opportunistically or in contravention of his or
her constituent's interests; rather, the representative is unwittingly consenting to a framing of the problem that justifies outcomes contrary to the longterm interests of the marginalized stakeholders.' °5 When this occurs there
is no clear conflict between the marginalized stakeholder representatives
and other more empowered stakeholders in the network. Nor are there issues important to traditionally marginalized stakeholders that are omitted or
unexpressed." 6 Rather, the marginalized stakeholder representative is in
positive collaboration with more wealthy or empowered members of the
agrees to plans or projects which disempower his
network, and ultimately
07
or her constituents.'
Both organizational and individual representatives can acquiesce. Organizations, both for-profits and non-profits, also gain legitimacy, power,
status, and resources by "conforming to the dominant cultural belief systems in [their] environment."' 0 8 Thus, organizations, through their managers and leaders, may agree to conceptualize problems and solutions in
terms that affirm the more dominant organizations or individuals in the collaborative network. Acquiescence can lead marginalized stakeholders and

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

See Alexander, supranote 22, at 162-63.
See id. at 141.
See id. at 162.
See id. at 138.
See id. at 141-42.
See id. at 136.
See id. at 138.
See HANDLER, supra note 98.
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their representatives who are participating in the decision-making forums
of urban reform to agree to inequitable distributive outcomes. Acquiescence is a power dilemma because it precludes fair and reasoned deliberation between the marginalized stakeholder representatives and other participants in the deliberative network. Fair and reasoned deliberation suggests
a dynamic in which each stakeholder representative expresses their constituents' needs, desires, goals, and solutions. The deliberative network, then,
considers the stated positions of each representative. From the arguments
proffered, the deliberative network then selects amongst the expressed options based upon the strength of each expressed argument and each solution's ability to resolve multiple and often competing objectives.
Instead, acquiescence represents a form of power whereby the more influential and assertive members of the deliberative stakeholder network,
through narratives, ideology, and other psycho-social processes, cause the
stakeholder representatives to accept positions or solutions that maximize
the economic and social interests of the dominant members of the network.' 09 Alternatives or contrary positions or solutions are never expressed
or even considered by the problem-solving network because the marginalized stakeholder representatives have accepted a framing of the problem
and its possible solutions that favors the more affluent and empowered
members of the network. 1 ° Thus, through acquiescence the dominant
members of the network obtain the willing consent of the marginalized
stakeholder representatives to plans and projects that may not be in their
long-term interests. Such representatives acquiesce either because they are
not knowledgeable about alternative outcomes or because they unwittingly
ascribe to narratives, ideologies, and frames that actually further ruling
class interests.
C.

Stakeholder Collaboration and Power

These common power dilemmas correspond to the three dimensions of
power first explicated by Steven Lukes in his seminal work, Power: A Radical View."' The first dimension is the overt and easily observed exercise
of power-where one person overtakes the will of another. 1 2 The second
109. See Alexander, supra note 22, at 138.
110. See id.
111. See STEVEN LuKEs, POWER: A RADicAL VIEw 23 (2d ed. 2005); see also Alexander,
supra note 22, at 135 (this analysis is based upon Steven Lukes' analysis of the dimensions
of power in his seminal work, POWER: A RADICAL VIEW, wherein Lukes argued that power
has at least three dimensions and that understanding the most subtle and empirically difficult
to prove dimension of power was necessary to understand how socially dominant groups
can secure the willing participation of those they successfully dominate).
112. See LUKES, supranote I11.
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is how power can operate to more subtly exclude and suppress certain individuals or reform goals from the decision-making agenda. 13 Third, acquiescence is the most pernicious and difficult to identify operation of
power, when "the dominant subject begins through narratives, discourse
to determine the suborand other ideological and psychological processes
1 14
desires."
and
needs
dinated object's wants,
Demographic representation operates at the first level of power. The
challenge is for traditionally marginalized stakeholders, or policymakers
seeking to ensure that the interests of traditionally marginalized groups are
represented in a reform effort, to identify a representative whose primary
allegiance is to the marginalized stakeholders' long-term interests. The
ideal representative is one "who will hold fast in the face of overt power
conflicts."' 15 In some instances, this may mean that a non-demographically
aligned individual or organization may be a better representative. "[T]he
researcher who seeks to study power at this level must study the easily observed behavior of stakeholder representatives throughout a [reform
process].""' 6
Representative opportunism operates at both the first and second levels
of power. Scholars studying this problem must observe both the explicit
behavior of the organizational or individual stakeholder representative, but
also make inferences about arguments, grievances, perspectives, and individuals that "fail to appear on the problem-solving agenda.""' 7 Such perspectives may be omitted because the representatives pursuing their own
selfish ends may seek to suppress such issues from the decision-making
agenda in contravention of their constituents' long-term interests. A researcher seeking to understand this second dimension must make inferences about marginalized stakeholders and their representatives, rather
than focus only on the easily observed behavior of the stakeholder representative. 118
Finally, representative acquiesce operates at the third-dimension of power, which is also the dimension most difficult to measure empirically. At
this level, the researcher must attempt to understand how hegemonic ideologies may operate to lead representatives to support outcomes that are not
in their constituents' long-term interests. Such inquiries are difficult to
measure, since it requires attempting to understand positions that are not

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

See id.
Alexander, supra note 22, at 136.
Id. at 137.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 136.
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expressed, as well as the relationship between internal subjective processes
and public policy outcomes. A researcher studying power at this level, at a
minimum, must observe the narratives that such stakeholder representatives
use to frame the reform challenge and must make inferences about whether
or not that framing leads to outcomes that are in the long-term interests of
marginalized stakeholders.
The operation of the above-mentioned forms of power present challenges for the presumed collaborative nature of new governance's voluntary and informal public/private stakeholder reform networks. As the profitmotive increasingly dominates urban reform projects, and as complex metropolitan dynamics increase possible social fissures along race, class, and
other lines, these levels of power may operate in any given reform project
to undermine positive collaboration between differently situated groups. 119
These power dilemmas may obscure unique forms of regulatory capture
that deviate from the standard instances-whereby a state agency charged
with advancing the public interest instead furthers commercial or powerful
special interests that dominate the regulated industry. 120 Instead, the interests of the dominant actors in the stakeholder network are furthered through
the informal stakeholder representative's behavior in the deliberative
process, rather than by a dominated bureaucratic agency.
New governance theory and practice's retreat from elected governments,
formal law, substantive and participatory rights, and confrontational lawyering may leave traditionally marginalized stakeholders without adequate recourse to ensure that their needs and desires are heard, respected,
and honored at the decision-making tables of urban reform.' 21 Thus, without adequate accountability measures, new governance's informal collaborations may lend themselves to a kind of sham participation and collaboration which precludes the most equitable resolution of regional problems.
New governance scholars increasingly recognize these potential pitfalls.122
One scholar asserts that in order to ensure that new governance experiments achieve their stated goals of participation, collaboration, and distributive reform, at least two preconditions are necessary. There must be "[1]
the broadest possible degree of stakeholder participation compatible with

119. See id.; Patience Crowder, "Ain't No Sunshine": Examining Informality and State
Open Meetings Acts as the Anti-Public Norm in Inner-City Redevelopment Deal Making, 74
TENN. L. REv. 623, 639 (2007).
120. Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Florrence, Regulatory Capture,PublicInterest, and
the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167 (1990) (defining regulatory capture).
121. See Alexander, supra note 22, at 165.
122. See generally de Biirca, supranote 27.
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effective decision-making, and [2] effective and informed monitoring."' 123
These preconditions are essential elements of the institutional design of any
new governance reform project.
Yet, even if the institutional design of a new governance reform effort
satisfies these preconditions, it is not clear that such elements are sufficient
to ensure that power dilemmas do not operate to undermine distributional
equity in regional reform. In the next section, this Article examines the
promising aspects of the institutional design of the Sustainable Communities Regional Planning Grant Program that may mitigate the problematic
operation of power in metropolitan reform collaborations. The Article also
analyzes the potential weaknesses of the Grant Program's institutional design that may permit power dilemmas to undermine the collaborative promise of the Grant Programs' regional collaborations.
III. THE SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES REGIONAL PLANNING GRANT
PROGRAM'S PROMISE

The Sustainable Communities Regional Planning Grant Program is an
attempt by the Obama Administration to resurrect federal incentives to fa24
cilitate regional collaboration as a condition to receive federal funding.
Yet, other than the 1960's housing and transportation programs mentioned
previously, there is little precedent in our federalist system for this type of
federal/regional regulatory cooperation.' 25 While the Grant Program is only one small federal government incentive program that devolves the resolution of regional problems to voluntary, public/private collaborations, it
provides an example of the promise and perils of new regionalism as new
governance. The Grant Program's institutional design reflects HUD's attempt to embrace new regionalism as new governance in that it imposes
few mandates or requirements on localities or metropolitan planning bodies. HUD also attempts, through the institutional design of the Grant Program, to address some of the shortcomings of traditional local government
law by facilitating regional cooperation and equity and resolving interrelated problems. The Grant Program's promising features, in this regard,
123. Id. at 235.
124. The Grant Program's Advance Notice and Request for Comment acknowledges that
"[w]hile the benefits of integrated regional planning are numerous, the incentives, institutions, and funding for such efforts are not widely available." See U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. &
URBAN DEV., FR-5396-N-01, SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES PLANNING GRANT PROGRAM ADVANCE NOTICE & REQUEST FOR COMMENT 7 (2010) [hereinafter ADVANCE NOTICE AND RE-

QUEST FOR COMMENT], available at http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id

=

SHGRANTPLAN.pdf.
125. See Briffault, supra note 17, at 1154 (describing the decline of federallregional collaboration during the 1960s and 1970s).
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include: (1) a commitment to broad multijurisdictional stakeholder participation, including the participation of traditionally marginalized stakeholders, throughout the Grant Program process; (2) requirements for applicants
to develop comprehensive solutions to interrelated problems; and (3) obligations for applicants to conduct effective and informed monitoring of their
progress throughout the grant planning process.
A.

Broad, Multijurisdictional, Stakeholder Participation

In structuring the Grant Program, HUD resisted a completely top-down
approach to regulation by requiring a high degree of stakeholder participation in both the creation of the Grant Program and throughout the process.
At the outset, HUD specifically tried to gain significant input from multiple
stakeholders about the Grant Program's institutional design. An Advance
Notice and Request for Comment (the "Advance Notice") was initiated
shortly after the Grant Program was announced. 1 26 The Advance Notice
requested feedback from "[s]tate and local governments, regional bodies,
community development entities, and a broad range of other stakeholders
on how the Program should be structured." 127 Specifically, HUD sought
feedback about several things, including the categories of regions that
should be included in the Grant Program, the types of activities that should
be allowed in each category, and common performance metrics for each
proposed funding category.1 28 HUD created a "Wiki" to serve as a repository for comments on the Grant Program's design and make it easy for
many different stakeholders to shape the goals of the Grant Program at its
inception. 129 HUD also conducted a series of outreach and listening sessions, as well as webinars, to educate the broad public about the Grant Program opportunity 3 ° These efforts were designed to increase the inclusiveness and transparency of the grant process.' 3
After the Notice of Funding Availability (NOFA) was devised, HUD retained its facilitative posture by imposing few requirements or mandates on
applicants, and by allowing much of the planning and solutions to regional
problems to come from the localities cooperating in a given region. While
HUD gave applicants substantial discretion in how to shape plans that
would advance long-term sustainability in their regions, it did provide minimum preconditions for what counts as a "region." Further, while the NO126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

See ADVANCE NOTICE AND REQUEST FOR COMMENT, supra note 124, at 1.

Id.
See id.
See id.at 2.
See id.
See id.
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FA did not require applications solely from governmental entities or general purpose regional governments, it did closely define what multijurisdic32
tional entities were eligible applicants for the Grant Program.
An eligible applicant is a "multijurisdictional and multi-sector partnership consisting of a consortium of governmental entities and non-profit
partners." ' 33 A consortium that represents a large metropolitan area with
an existing MPO must include certain collaborators in the effort, such as:
(1) the principal city or cities within the region; (2) any other general unit
of government with the largest population in the region; (3) other localities
or Tribes that ensure that the consortium represents no less than fifty percent of the population within the region; (4) the existing MPO or regional
planning agency, if any; and (5) a non-profit organization, foundation, or
educational institution within the region that can "engage a diverse representation of the general population" and has "the ability to work with the
units of general local government." 134 The Grant Program also provides
requirements for eligible applicants from "non-defined areas," which include any area outside the boundaries of an existing Metropolitan Statistical Area.' 35 Thus, the Grant Program does mandate what essential entities
must be part of a consortium. As such, a mandate for broad stakeholder
participation is incorporated into the Grant Program's design. Beyond
those minimum requirements, however, the Grant Program gives applicants
substantial leeway in determining which entities should be part of the consortium.
A consortium will not be recognized unless it can produce a written
Partnership Agreement or a Memorandum of Understanding that evidences
a commitment between all the members of the consortium to work as a
group.' 36 The Partnership Agreement or Memorandum of Understanding

must be executed within one hundred twenty days after the effective start
date of the agreement and it must be signed by all relevant members of the
consortium.1 37 The consortium must identify a "lead applicant" to act in a
representative capacity with HUD and to hold fiscal and administrative responsibility for the consortium.1 38 Consortiums that receive funding must
also work in partnership with public housing authorities in the region, al-

132. See NOTICE OF FUNDING AVAILABILITY, supra note 10, at 18-20.
133. Id. at 18.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

See id.
Id. at 19.
See id. at 20.
See id.
See id. at 19.
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though such entities need not be formal members of the consortium.13 9 The
requirement of submitting the Memoranda of Understanding demonstrates
that the Grant Program seeks to encourage voluntary, interlocal cooperative
agreements, whereby the obligations between parties are outlined via contract rather than via statutory regulation. It is also an element designed to
hold applicants accountable to their stated claims of collaboration and
broad stakeholder participation.
Finally, since the Grant Program is a competitive program, applicants
are selected on the basis of the number of points in each rating factor that
they receive. "Only those applicants that meet the threshold review requirements will be rated and ranked."' 4 ° HUD ranks all eligible applicants
that meet the threshold requirements.' 4 ' A total of 102 points can be
awarded to an application. 4 2 Award sizes are ultimately based on regional
population size and geographic boundaries.' 43 Applicants are categorized
as either "Large Metropolitan Regions; Medium Sized Regions; or SmallSized Regions, Rural Communities or Small Town Areas."' 44 Within each
geographic formulation, HUD determines a minimum and maximum grant
amount. 145 The points system helps HUD to determine the most eligible
applicants within each category. "The scoring criteria used to award the
maximum eligible points [in each rating factor of the] NOFA are how fully
and thoroughly the applicant answers each item listed in each rating factor."' 146 All applicants who receive a certain threshold score in their 2010
submission will qualify for preferred sustainability status, which also qualifies the applicant for "a broad spectrum of benefits" including capacity
building resources and points in other funding competitions run by other
14 7
agencies.
Much like the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC), the New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC), and other federal tax credit or grant programs for
housing and community development, HUD reveals its normative priorities
and objectives for the Grant Program through the number of points it allo-

139.
140.
141.
142.

See id.
at 21.
Id.at 60.
See id.
U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., FR-5415-N-01, POLICY REQUIREMENTS &
GENERAL SECTION TO HUD's FY 2010 NOFAs FOR DISCRETIONARY PROGRAMS 61 [hereinafter POLICY REQUIREMENTS & GENERAL SECTION], available at http://www.hud.gov/
offices/adm/grants/nofa10/gensec.pdf.
143. NOTICE OF FUNDING AVAILABILITY, supra note 10, at 15-18.
144. Id.at 15.
145. See id.at 16-17.
146. Id.at 60.
147. Id.at 9.
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cates to each rating factor. Rating factors with a higher maximum number
of points indicate that the regulatory goal at issue is a high priority for
HUD. In its Rating Factors, HUD demonstrates its commitment to the inclusion of marginalized stakeholders in both the planning and implementation of the regional plan, and as beneficiaries of the plan. 148 HUD gives fif149
ty-five points to the "soundness of the approach" outlined in the plan.
Of those fifty-five points, seventeen points are awarded to how the consortium structures the planning process to advance equity, inclusion, and sustainability. 5 ° Those are the most points awarded to a subcategory within
the "soundness of the approach" rating factor.' 5 ' Thus, the Grant Program's institutional design demonstrates a commitment to incentivize and
to maximize the participation of multiple stakeholders in the grant planning
process, including traditionally marginalized or underserved stakeholders.
B.

Equitable and Comprehensive Solutions to Interrelated Problems

While the NOFA includes very few threshold requirements or substantive mandates,' 5 2 it does encourage applicants to develop a planning
process, and a long-range plan that responds to some of local government
law's failures to facilitate comprehensive solutions to interrelated problems. The NOFA encourages this in its definition of eligible activities. Eligible activities are defined as "tasks necessary to develop a comprehensive
Regional Plan for Sustainable Development (RPSD), to align investments
with this plan, to improve the management capability to implement the
plan, and to develop relevant policy, planning and evaluation capacity."' 5 3
The NOFA lists, as an eligible activity, the development of a comprehensive regional plan that integrates existing land use plans in a number of
areas.154 The NOFA also encourages applicants to explain how they will
adopt a housing plan that meets the need for affordable housing throughout
the region,' 55 and "incorporate[s] equity and fair housing analysis into regional planning."' 156 Applicants are also encouraged to undertake regional
transportation planning, 157 water infrastructure planning, 158 environmental
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

See id at 38-59.
See id at 44, 61.
See id. at 45-46.
See id. at 61.
See id. at 28-30.
See id. at 22.
See id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
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planning,' 59 economic development planning, 160 and climate change impact
assessments, 161 among other activities. This guidance for what constitutes
an eligible activity directs applicants to consider the interrelated nature of
regional problems when developing their applications.
The definition of eligible activities in the NOFA, however, does not require applicants to undertake such activities; it simply encourages such activities by providing examples in the definition. The NOFA clarifies that
"[a]pplicants are not limited to the activities described below and are not
required to address all of the activities but shall address those necessary to
62
develop a comprehensive RPSD as is appropriate to their local context.'
Thus, while the NOFA encourages applicants to develop plans to address
multi-issue regional problems, it does not mandate certain activities or include them as threshold requirements to receive funding. Lastly, the NOFA also incentivizes applicants to develop plans that address the interrelated nature of regional problems in their description of the needs that the
regional plan will address. 163 It awards more points to plans that recognize
the interrelated nature of regional problems, such as housing, transportation, water management, environmental sustainability, economic development, climate change, and plans that take affirmative steps to resolve such
64
problems in a comprehensive way.'
C.

Effective and Informed Monitoring

The institutional design of the Grant Program also includes mechanisms
to ensure that applicants achieve their stated results. HUD evaluates applicants' progress toward their stated goals throughout the process. 165 The
166
applicant is required to clearly identify its plan's outcomes and benefits.
HUD identified eight outcomes that it requires all regions to incorporate
into their plans as key to "achieving sustainability."' 167 These outcomes reflect HUD's efforts to design the Grant Program to respond to the limitations of local government law in resolving region-wide problems. For example, two required outcomes include: (1) "the creation of regional
transportation, housing, water, and air quality plans that are deeply aligned

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

See id.
at 25.
See id.
See id. at 26.
Id.at 22.
See id.
at 39-42.
Id at 3.
Id. at 57.
See id.
Id.
at 57-58.
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and tied to local comprehensive land use and capital investment plans"; and
(2) "[r]educed social and economic disparities for the low-income, minority
communities, and other disadvantaged populations within the target region." 168 Beyond the eight required outcomes, the Grant Program gives
applicants substantial latitude to develop other outcomes and goals. 169 The
Grant Program also requires applicants to develop benchmarks that are
measures of progress toward achieving the stated goals at six-month,
70
twelve-month, and twenty-four-month intervals.'
The Rating Factor Form that applicants must complete asks applicants to
identify very specific goals as they relate to Rating Factor 5-Achieving
Results and Program Evaluation. On the form, the applicants must: (1) list
a regional planning issue to be addressed; (2) identify a long-term outcome
that will demonstrate progress toward addressing the planning issue to be
resolved; (3) demonstrate the livability principle that the outcome will further; (4) outline the particular stated HUD goal that the outcome addresses;
(5) identify an applicable activity to advance the outcome, and state what
progress they expect to make towards pursuing that activity at six, twelve,
and twenty-four months; and finally, (6) identify a measure of progress that
relates to the anticipated outcomes at each stage. HUD also encourages all
applicants who receive awards to utilize the HUD e-Logic Model to manage the data necessary to demonstrate progress in achieving the stated outcomes.1 71 The logic model is a tool that allows HUD and the applicants to
reconcile the stated goals of the plan with empirical data.' 72 A final
workplan and the e-logic models are due sixty days after the effective date
of the agreement. 73 The short intervals in which applicants are required to
report progress towards stated outcomes suggest that participation, equity,
and accountability will be monitored frequently, helping to increase the potential effectiveness of the Grant Program.
The Sustainable Communities Regional Planning Grant Program is,
therefore, a promising federal initiative designed to address some of the
most complex challenges that preclude significant progress on sustainable
housing reforms in the modem urban metropolis. In order to advance regional sustainability, HUD designed the Grant Program to help localities
overcome deficiencies in local government laws. The Grant Program attempts to resolve the challenges of localism by allocating money to region-

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at 58.
See id. at 57.
See id.

& GENERAL SECTION, supra note 142, at 61-63.
Id.
173. NOTICE OF FUNDING AVAILABILITY, supra note 10, at 64.
POLICY REQUIREMENTS
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al collaborations and requiring that multiple organizations and governmental bodies within a region devise a written collaboration agreement detailing how collaboration will be facilitated. This element of the Grant Program is designed to facilitate planning, cooperation, and coordination
between multijurisdictional governmental bodies and non-governmental
groups.
Housing reformers' failure to see how housing law and policy is inexorably tied to other important substantive questions such as job creation, education, economic empowerment, environmental stewardship, and broader
land use patterns has also been an Achilles heel. The Grant Program responds to local government law's failure to facilitate cooperation around
interdependent challenges by awarding more points to plans that propose
comprehensive solutions to substantively integrated problems.' 7 4 The exclusion of low-income, traditionally marginalized, stakeholders in the planning and implementation of reform has also been a consistent critique of
federal housing programs. The Grant Program addresses this by encouraging localities to include traditionally marginalized groups in the planning
process.' 75 HUD's commitment to make the resolution of such longstanding problems a central aspect of the Grant Program's institutional design is also a promising aspect of the program. It is not clear, however, that
the broad stakeholder participation, comprehensive solutions to interrelated
problems, and monitoring that the Grant Program requires is sufficient to
mitigate the complex operation of power in informal, regional, public/private stakeholder collaborations. Next, Part IV explores the possible
perils that the Grant Program's design may fail to address.
IV. THE SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES REGIONAL PLANNING GRANT
PROGRAM'S PERILS

Despite the positive aspects of the Grant Program, some possible perils
still exist. This section outlines possible threats to marginalized stakeholders' meaningful participation in regional reform. Some aspects of the
Grant Program's institutional design may leave the Grant Program's consortium collaborations susceptible to the various power dilemmas mentioned above. Demographic representation, representative opportunism,
and representative acquiescence can result from: (1) the Grant Program's
failure to mandate the participation of certain constituents in the consortium; (2) its encouragement of public/private partnerships and the leveraging of funds; and (3) its requirement that consortium participants have ex-

174. See id. at 46.
175. See id. at 27, 45.
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tensive experience and capacity. Lastly, this Part illustrates how the
process of consortium development in Madison, Wisconsin, while generally positive, may indicate that certain power dilemmas are at work that the
Grant Program is not designed to address.
Specifically, HUD encourages consortiums that include governmental
agencies at different levels, non-profits, and other more informal public/private collaborations. Traditionally marginalized stakeholders and
their representatives may find these collaborations to be politically and socially treacherous terrain. This Article does not intend to construe traditionally marginalized stakeholders or their representatives as incapable of
self-advocacy, articulating or fighting for their interests, or collaborating
with others in sophisticated urban reform efforts. To the contrary, throughout the history of housing and community development advocacy, several
groups have been very effective in this regard.' 76 This Article, however,
does contend that urban centers are increasingly areas of intense social contestation. As globalization and metropolitanization increase the number of
constituents who have a claim to, and a stake in, urban territory, lowincome people of color and other traditionally underserved groups have to
assert their needs against the backdrop of increasingly complex social fissures. When decision-making and planning about the futures of regions is
devolved to regional, intergovernmental, and public/private collaborations,
the design of such collaborative networks is essential to ensuring that distributive equity is realized. While the regional collaborations that the Grant
Program encourages may provide important local context and experience,
and help localities to understand their interdependence, there is also a risk
that, absent sufficient mandates or public law protections, such voluntary
and informal networks will operate to undermine important public and distributional values.
A.

Demographic Representation

The Grant Program allocates points to applicants if they can demonstrate
their consortium's organizational capacity to fulfill the plan.' 77 This requirement may incentivize the lead applicant to choose as partners individual or organizational representatives who are more professionalized, rather

176. See generally URBAN PROBLEMS AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT (Ronald F. Ferguson & William T. Dickens eds., 1999) (outlining the history of past urban development programs and the successes of community development groups and informal social organizations).
177. See NOTICE OF FUNDING AVAILABILITY, supra note 10, at 61-62.

658

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XXXVIII

than grassroots-oriented. 178 These professionalized individuals or organizations may appear or purport to represent marginalized stakeholders' interests because the representative organization or individual is from the
same demographic background as the marginalized stakeholder group. The
stakeholder representatives, however, may not be as attentive to the concerns of grassroots or politically-activist stakeholders, who may have legitimate ideas about how to advance equity within the region. Thus, grassroots groups, who may confront and challenge the more established stakestakeholders in the consortium, may be excluded from the consortium. The
Grant Program does not appear to provide recourse for stakeholders who
179
attempted to join, but who were not selected as a part of the consortium.
Thus, HUD might consider allowing stakeholders who are not ultimately
part of the consortium to file a social impact statement in which they can
articulate why they were denied participation in the proposed plan, what
their alternative visions are, or how they will be impacted by a plan pro1 80
posed by a consortium in their region.
Additionally, the localities that truly exacerbate inequity within a region
may elect not to participate. The Grant Program's institutional design attempts to combat this problem by incentivizing the regional consortium to
1 81
get the participation and buy in of key localities and cities in the region.
Yet, to the extent that the favored quarters do not elect to participate, those
localities whose local land use decisions most frequently undermine regional equity may continue their practices, thereby impeding the progress
of sustainable solutions. While the deliberative process of collaborative

178. See Sheila R. Foster & Brian Glick, IntegrativeLawyering: Navigating the Political
Economy of Urban Redevelopment, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1999, 2017 n.59 (2007) (citing Randy
Stoecker, The CDC Model of Urban Redevelopment: A Political Critique and an Alterna-

tive, 19 J. URB. AFF. 1 (1997)) (explaining that as community groups assume the role of developers and hire increasingly professional and technical staff they become alienated from
the interests of local community groups).
179. In Madison, Wisconsin, representatives of the Southdale Neighborhood Association
explained that despite their efforts to develop an ambitious plan to advance equity in a lowincome minority and white working class neighborhood, the lead applicant did not select
them as a member of the consortium. See Telephone Interview with Paul Finch, Legal Consultant to Michael Goldsby (Aug. 23, 2010).
180. This Article derives the concept of social impact statements from the definition of
environmental impact statements under the National Environmental Policy Act. Environmental impact statements require proposed projects to disclose their environmental impacts,
including "adverse effects" of the project. Scholars have suggested that a social capital impact statement might help identify the pro-social capital and negative social capital effects
of a particular project. See THOMAS SANDER, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS AND
THEIR LESSONS FOR SOCIAL CAPITAL ANALYSIS 4 (1999), available at http://www.hks.

harvard.edu/saguaro/pdfs/sandereisandsklessons.pdf.
181. See NOTICE OF FuNDING AVAILABILITY, supra note 10, at 1-2, 45.
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long-range regional planning may help localities and other stakeholders in
the region to identify their collective regional interests, without strong
state-level mandates that require localities to engage in regional land use
reform, many of the most important localities may decline to participate.
The favored quarter may resist participating or it may participate in a manner that precludes the most equitable solutions over the long-term.
B.

Representative Opportunism

The Grant Program also encourages applicants to substantially engage
the private sector and business interests in the consortium. 182 Economic
competitiveness and distributive equity are both key stated goals of the
Grant Program. However, these goals are often in tension in any urban
reform planning effort. Involving private sector or business interests in the
consortium does risk that the private for-profit business entities may come
to dominate the reform agenda in a manner that does not benefit traditionally marginalized groups. While the rating factors criteria attempt to mitigate
this problem, it is unclear how a marginalized group can articulate its concerns with the consortium during the process. This is particularly true if
the lead agency is the group that does the reporting to HUD. How can the
consortium hold the lead agency accountable during the planning process?
What if the lead agency provides data about the number of disadvantaged
stakeholders who are participating in the planning process, but fails to articulate the strategic battles at the micro decision-making level that such parties lost? Should a private right of action to halt the planning process exist,
if tensions arise within a consortium? Is the price of this constraint on the
planning process too high? Would it allow disgruntled groups to hijack an
important plan, falsely, in the name of equity or inclusion? Or would such
a constraint further ensure that consortium participants are responding to
traditionally marginalized constituents' concerns throughout the bargaining
183
process because it acts as a regulatory penalty default rule?
HUD also understandably places a high priority on how the consortium
leverages HUD funds with other sources. 184 While this requirement will
produce cost savings and help to enhance the efficiency of the Grant Program, it may be in tension with the requirement to include marginalized
constituents and devise solutions which benefit such populations over the
long-term. An increase in a plan's private financial resources may also in182. See id. at 24-25.
183. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Adaptive Ecosystem Management and Regulatory Penalty Defaults: Toward a BoundedPragmatism, 87 MINN. L. REv. 943, 967 (2003) (defining

"regulatory penalty default" rules).
184. See NOTICE OF FUNDING

AvAILABILrIY,

supra note 10, at 18.
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crease the influence that private interests have over the design of the regional plan. Certain fundamental equity principles, resident ownership
structures, or other considerations that should operate as constraints or factors in the planning process may be excluded as more private money is
provided to finance the plan. Consortium members may attempt to demonstrate a commitment to helping marginalized constituents by stating the
number of units of affordable housing proposed in the vicinity of transit
hubs, for example. They may, however, fail to consider co-housing or
community land trust ownership structures which facilitate long-term
community stewardship of resources, but sacrifice profitability and wealth
building. Thus, development structures which enhance gentrification may
be privileged over development forms that actually promote long-term equity.
C.

Representative Acquiescence

If the localities whose local land use decisions most undermine regional
equity do elect to participate in the consortium, their participation may
cause the consortium to reject those planning possibilities that really enhance the benefits of reform for the most marginalized stakeholders. Marginalized stakeholder representatives may be present in the network or organizations that serve such constituencies may participate, but they may
acquiesce in decisions that advance the interests of the more empowered
localities in the region because of a failure to recognize alternative possibilities. To the extent that most participant organizations in the regional network have similar professional goals and objectives, the organizations that
represent traditionally marginalized stakeholders may assent to solutions
which re-distribute resources, but do so in a less aggressive way because
they accept the dominant stakeholders' framing of regional challenges. As
such, the most aggressively equitable solutions may not be included in
many reform plans. If collectively, several regional applicants fail to submit plans to HUD that aggressively pursue distributive equity, HUD will
likely still provide the money to whatever level of collaboration and cooperation is submitted.
D.

The Case of Madison, Wisconsin and Dane County

The sections above analyze only the potential promise and perils of the
Grant Program. The Grant Program is too new for a significant empirical
study of outcomes. HUD only recently released the names of the Grant
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Program's Finalist Grantees.' 85 HUD awarded $98 million of federal funding to forty-five regional areas, reserving $2 million for capacity grants for
selected grantees.' 86 The grantees will be engaged in their planning
processes over the next three years. The list of grantees and projects is impressive and suggests that the Grant Program spurred and supported important collaborations to resolve regional challenges. 187 While the local contexts of these various regional collaborations differ significantly, an
analysis of the formulation of one consortium in the Madison, Wisconsin
and Dane County regional area suggests that the process of consortium creation itself may reveal certain power dynamics that the Grant Program's
institutional design will not uncover or address. An analysis of the federal
Grant Program's success depends not only on analyzing quantitative outcomes, but also on studying the micro-level decision-making of public/private collaborations and the process by which problems are resolved.
This Article proceeds to provide that type of micro-level analysis of the
process of consortium creation in the Madison, Wisconsin and Dane County area.
Recently, three regional collaborations in Wisconsin were awarded
funds by the Grant Program.' 88 In the Madison, Wisconsin and Dane
County regional area, the Capital Area Regional Planning Commission
(CARPC) was awarded $1,997,500 to further develop a regional master
plan titled, "Vision 2020 the Dane County Land Use and Transportation
Plan" (the "Plan"). 189 CARPC is the designated regional planning agency
in the area under Wisconsin Statutes § 66.0309.190 The Plan was prepared

185. See Press Release, Brian Sullivan, U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., HUD Awards
Nearly $100 Million in New Grants to Promote Smarter and Sustainable Planning for Jobs
and Economic Growth (Oct. 14, 2010), availableat http://portal.hud.gov:80/hudportal/HUD
?src=/press/press releasesmedia advisories/2010/HUDNo.10-233 (last visited Jan. 6,
2011).
186. Id.
187. See U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEv., FY2010 SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES REGIONAL PLANNING GRANT SUMMARIES, available at http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/docu
ments/huddoc?id=OSHCFY 1ORegAppList.pdf.
188. See U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES REGIONAL
PLANNING GRANT FINALISTS, available at http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc
?id=SustanableFinalists.pdf.
189. Press Release, Laura J. Feldman, U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., HUD Awards
Nearly $3 Million to Promote Smarter and Sustainable Planning for Jobs and Economic
Growth in Wisconsin (Oct. 14, 2010), available at http://danedocs.countyofdane.comweb
docs/PDF/capd/2010_postings/RegionalPlanningGrantWisconsinRelease l4Oct.pdf (last
visited Feb. 16, 2011).
190. See CAPITAL AREA REG'L PLANNING COMM'N, CARPC REGIONAL PROFILE 1 (2010)

[hereinafter CAPITAL AREA REG'L PLANNING COMM'N, PROFILE], available at http://dane
docs.countyofdane.com/webdocs/PDF/capd/2010_postings/CARPC_Regional Profile.pdf.
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and adopted in 1997 by the predecessor agency to CARPC. 19' Other regional plans for the area were also adopted that address "specific functional
areas and systems."' 9 2 Together these plans constitute the Regional Master
93
Plan and meet Wisconsin's Comprehensive Planning Law Requirements.
CARPC, however, applied for funds because these "regional plans are advisory and lack clear enforcement authority."'

94

CARPC asserted that "the

main avenue for ensuring local implementation is through building a collaborative alliance with local units of government, an approach that requires
resources which are in generally short supply." 195 Thus, CARPC applied
for funds to develop a collaborative local network of regional planning
196
agencies and localities to coordinate long-range regional plans.
CARPC is the lead applicant for the consortium. CARPC has thirtyseven years of extensive experience in regional planning and community
development. Consequently, in keeping with the Grant Program's requirement, CARPC devised a consortium consisting of experienced key
partner organizations, including the Madison Area Transportation Planning
Board, the City of Madison, Dane County, and the City of Fitchburg,
among other participants.' 97 CARPC's consortium has outlined a positive,
ambitious, and promising plan to enhance sustainability. Notably, seven
municipalities in the region chose not to participate in the regional planning
consortium.1 98 CARPC intends to keep an "open invitation" to those localities and will devise a marketing plan to inform the municipalities of the
99
positive outcomes of the plan. 1
The consortium demonstrated its commitment "to ensure that the perspectives of diverse and traditionally underrepresented populations directly
influence the development and implementation of the Regional Plan for
Sustainable Development, 20 ' by including consortium partners that

191. See CAPITAL AREA REG'L PLANNING COMM'N, RATING FACTOR NARRATIVE: CAPITAL
REGION SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES INITIATIVE 1 (2010) [hereinafter CAPITAL AREA REG'L
PLANNING COMM'N, NARRATIVE], available at http://danedocs.countyofdane.com/webdocs/
PDF/capd/20 1O_postings/SCIGrant/Capital%20Region%20WI%20Narrative.pdf.
192. See CAPITAL AREA REG'L PLANNING COMM'N, APPENDIx: CAPITAL REGION WISCONSIN SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES GRANT APPLICATION 1 (2010), available at http://dane

docs.countyofdane.com/webdocs/PDF/capd/2010_postings/SCIGrant/APPENDIX%2Cap
ital%20Region%20WI.pdf.
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. See id.at 1-2.
197. See CAPITAL AREA REG'L PLANNING COMM'N, NARRATIVE, supra note 191, at 1-3.

198. See id.at 18.
199. See id.
200. See id. at 19.
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represent such populations. CARPC has invited the Urban League of
Greater Madison, the Latino Support Network, and United Way of Dane
County to participate in the consortium as organizations that represent the
perspectives of traditionally underserved groups.2 1' Additionally, CARPC
intends to form a social equity committee within the consortium that will
meet to strategize about how to advance regional equity in the plan. Undoubtedly, the above mentioned groups have a strong and important track
record in the Madison, WI/Dane County area for advancing the interests of
traditionally marginalized groups. The consortium's effort to include them
in the planning process suggests its sincere desire to include marginalized
constituents and their representatives in the process.
1.

The Local Fresh FoodMarket

The consortium also intends to demonstrate its commitment to sustainability through the creation of four "catalytic projects. ' '202 The catalytic
projects include: (1) a Sustainability Commerce Center in the City of Madison; (2) a Fresh Market Vegetable Packing House Feasibility Study, led by
Dane County; (3) a Local Fresh Food Market in a Low-Income Food
Desert,20 3 (Feasibility Study and Business Plan) led by Dane County; and
(4) a 100% Stormwater Infiltration System for a High-Density Transit
Oriented Development. 0 4 The catalytic project of a Local Fresh Food
Market in a Low-Income Food Desert is one of the plan elements designed
to advance social equity and address the needs of low-income, traditionally
underserved groups.205

The food market catalytic project will be located near the Southdale
Neighborhood. CARPC describes the Southdale Neighborhood as consisting of "underserved communities with low-incomes, high unemployment
and a general lack of access to goods and services." The Southdale Neighborhood is located in the Town of Madison, which is a small, local municipality situated between the larger Cities of Madison and Fitchburg, both in
the Dane County regional area. Over time, the Town's territory was gradually incorporated into the Cities of Madison and Fitchburg, and the remain-

201. See id.at 18.
202. See id.at 14.
203. See MARI GALLAGHER, EXAMINING THE IMPACT OF FOOD DESERTS ON PUBLIC
HEALTH INCHICAGO 5 (2006), availableat http://www.yaleruddcenter.org/resources/upload/
docs/what/policy/ChicagoFoodDesertReport.pdf (defining a food desert as a large geographic area with distant or no grocery stores).
204. See CAPITAL AREA REG'L PLANNING COMM'N, NARRATIVE, supra note 191, at 14.
205. See id. at 20.
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ing territory is slated to be annexed into Fitchburg and Madison in 2022,
rendering the Town of Madison extinct.2 °6
Redevelopment of the Southdale Neighborhood was a key objective of
the Town of Madison's 2001 Neighborhood Revitalization Plan, adopted
by Dane County and approved by HUD.2 °7 One key objective of the Town
of Madison's plan was the creation of a small grocery store within the
neighborhood.20 8 CARPC describes the location of the proposed fresh food
market as a "food desert," in which residents lack access to fresh food,
don't have access to cars, and must rely on local convenience stores with
expensive and unhealthy products. 20 9 Through the Local Fresh Food Market Project, CARPC will seek to "create partnerships that will form direct
links between the region's vital agricultural producers," and low-income
minority end users in need of better nutrition. 210 The Grant Program's resources will be used to develop a business plan for the Local Fresh Food
Market. The business plan will include projections of operating revenues
and expenses, pricing and sourcing opportunities for locally grown food,
surveys of neighborhood residents, and focus groups to ascertain capacity
and demand as part of financial due diligence. 2 11 The total projected cost
of these planning efforts is $75,000; the planning is estimated to take six to
2 12
seven months.
The Local Fresh Food Market will be located in a site on the Novation
Campus, adjacent to the Southdale Neighborhood.2 13 The Novation Campus is a Brownfield redevelopment project214 led by an experienced and established area private developer, the Alexander Company.2 15 The private
company is nationally renowned and has extensive experience in Brown-

206. Madison (Town), Wisconsin, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Madison_(to

wn),_Wisconsin (last visited Mar. 1, 2011).
207. See CAPITAL AREA REG'L PLANNING COMM'N, NARRATIVE, supra note 191, at 17.
208. See id.

209. See id.
210. Id.
211. See id.
212. Id.
213. See id.
214. Brownfields are "abandoned, idled, or underused industrial and commercial sites
where expansion or redevelopment is complicated by real or perceived environmental contamination." Amy L. Edwards, When Brown Meets Green: Integrating SustainableDevelopment Principles Into Brownfield Redevelopment Projects, 18 WIDENER L.J. 859 n.1

(2009).
215. See The Alexander Company, ALEXANDER Co., http://alexandercompany.com/ (follow "Company" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 1, 2011) ("Specializing in urban infill, new
construction, [B]rownfield revitalization, and historic preservation, our developments give
new life to historically significant buildings and urban neighborhoods.").
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field redevelopment, sustainable urban-infill projects, and historic preservation. 2 16 The Novation Campus is Madison, Wisconsin's largest commercial, sustainable, urban-infill project, and is projected to provide over one
217 It is located
million square feet of sustainable, commercial office space.
on a former industrial site. 2 18 In addition to being a Brownfield site, the
219
Novation Campus is located in a Tax Increment Financing District (TIF).
The TIF was specifically created to support the Novation Campus redevelopment. Previously, Wisconsin TIF law prohibited towns from creating
TIF districts, but the Alexander Company lobbied the state to change the
220 The law was
law to allow towns with border agreements to create TIFs.
changed and the Novation Campus received approximately three million
dollars in projected tax increment financing for Brownfields remediation.
It is also expected to apply for and receive an additional twelve million dollars for the Novation Campus. 22 1 Many argue that the Brownfields remediation needed to revitalize the site could not have occurred without the TIF
financing.

222

Growing Power, Inc. is also a partner in the Local Fresh Food Market
project. Growing Power, Inc. is a nationally recognized non-profit organization and land trust, which seeks to advance equal access to healthy food
for all communities through the creation of sustainable, community-based
agricultural food systems. 223 The organization is the brainchild of, and is
run by, Will Allen, a MacArthur Genius grant recipient and nationally renowned innovator, who works on urban agriculture and sustainable food
224 Alsystems in Milwaukee, Madison, Chicago, and other urban centers.
len is an African-American resident of Milwaukee who has an unquestioned record of success and accountability to low-income minority com-

216. See id.
217. See id.
218. See id.
219. A TIF is a debt structure authorized by state enabling legislation that takes the estimated future increase in property taxes generated by proposed redevelopment activities and
captures that future tax increment to finance the redevelopment activities. See Dina Schlossberg, Tax Increment Financing,in BUILDING HEALTHY COMMUNITIES: A GUIDE TO COMMUNTIY DEVELOPMENT FOR ADVOCATES, LAWYERS AND POLICYMAKERS 129-30 (Roger A. Clay,
Jr. & Susan R. Jones eds., 2009).
220. Vikki Kratz, Losing the Farm, IsTHMus (Jan. 23, 2009), http://www.thedailypage.
com/isthmus/article.php?article=2490 1.
221. Id.
222. See id.
223. See GROWING POWER, INC., http://growingpower.org/index.htm (last visited Jan. 7,
2011).
224. See CAPITAL AREA REG'L PLANNING COMM'N, PROFILE, supra note 190, at 18.
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munities. 225 He has been selected by first lady Michelle Obama as a part226
ner in her efforts to combat childhood obesity.

In Madison, Will Allen is also involved in a grassroots effort with other
progressive organizations, such as the Center for Resilient Cities, and businesses, such as Madison Gas and Electric, to create "a community center, a
project-based middle school, a five-thousand-square-foot mixed-use development with neighborhood-focused businesses such as a restaurant and coffee shop, an MG&E Energy Services Center and several acres of intensive,
year-round urban agriculture. 22 7 This school, and the other efforts, all
center on job training for, and the creation of, high-road, green-collar
22 8

jobs.

The final main partner in the Local Fresh Food Market project is Robert
Pierce, a long-time African-American farmer and founder of the South
Madison Farmer's Market, who currently operates "a weekly farmers market within the Novation Campus and is interested in establishing a yearround market., 229 These project partners are undeniably qualified. Will
Allen and Robert Pierce, in particular, seem to be demographically and
ideologically aligned with the interests of low-income, underserved populations in the Dane County area, and they have a good track record of outcomes and accountability to low-income minority communities. 23 0 Thus, it
is logical that CARPC would select these partners for a project to further
social equity goals.
2.

Strugglefor the Soul of Southdale andDrumlin Farms

Yet, despite this seeming alignment of interests, there have been a number of power struggles over the future of the Southdale Neighborhood. Although the Southdale Neighborhood has been described as having a "dismal reputation" with low rates of homeownership and high crime, there are
some positive aspects of the community, such as the Drumlin Farms area,
"a rural five-acre farm that operated as a site for Community
Supported

225. See Maggie Ginsberg-Schutz, Pay Dirt,MADISON MAG., Aug. 2010, at 1,available
at http://www.madisonmagazine.com/Madison-Magazine/August_2010/Pay-Dirt/ (explaining that Will Allen has been selected as one of Time Magazine's Top 100 Most Influential
People for his work on sustainable urban agriculture in low-income minority communities).
226. See Allen, Will, C-SPAN Biographical History, C-SPAN VIDEO LIBRARY, http://
www.c-spanarchives.org/willallen (last visited Mar. 1, 2011).
227. Ginsberg-Schutz, supra note 225.
228. Id.
229. CAPITAL AREA REG'L PLANNING COMM'N, PROFILE, supranote 190, at 18.
230. See SouTH MADISON FARMER'S MARKET, http://southmadisonfarmersmarket.com/
(last visited Jan. 7, 2011).
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Agriculture (CSA)., 2 3 1 CSAs are a way for local farmers to market their
2 32
The
produce to local consumers who buy shares of the farmers' crops.
in
gardens
community
and
farmhouses
contained
also
area
Farms
Drumlin
23 3 The Drumlin
plots.
rented
families
which, at one time, more than thirty
Farms territory will be annexed into the City of Fitchburg by 2022.234 Yet,
235 In the
the Drumlin Farms were conducted on rented, not owned land.
late 1990s, some Drumlin supporters unsuccessfully tried to raise enough
funds to purchase the property. 236 In 2007, the Alexander Company purCampus. 237
chased Drumlin Farms as territory for the proposed Novation
As of 2009, the Alexander Company was "clearing the site" of existing
housing and other structures because the Company deemed the existing
structures to be in "very rough shape" and "cost-prohibitive" to refurbish or
retain. 238 One Southdale resident argued that "the people who have been
advocating are being evicted from the farm.

239

Some local residents assert that, thus far, the Alexander Company has
bought extensive land in the Southdale Neighborhood, including the Drumlin Farms area, for its commercial Novation Campus. Yet, there are few
proposed community benefits for current local residents from the new development.24 ° Original plans for the Novation Campus showed a parking
lot and multistory building in the location of the community gardens of
Drumlin Farms. 24 1 Further, some residents argue that despite formal public
meetings, they feel that "Alexander's plans don't include them" and that
the Novation Campus project has moved forward with "little public input. '242 Some residents contend that the Alexander Company has only given "lip service to inclusion." 24 3 Former Drumlin Farms and current South-

dale residents are also concerned that they will ultimately be victims, rather

231. Id.
232. See, e.g., Community Supported Agriculture, LOCAL HARVEST, http://www.local
harvest.org/csa/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2011) (describing CSAs as popular way for consumers
to by shares of local seasonal food directly from a farmer).
233. See Kratz, supra note 220.
234. See id.
235. See id.
236. See id.
237. See id.
238. See id.
239. See id.
240. See id.; see also Interview with Michael Goldsby, Consultant for Southdale Neighborhood Ass'n, Madison, WI. (2010) [hereinafter Goldsby Interview].
241. See Kratz, supra note 220.
242. See id.
243. See id.
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than beneficiaries, of the new project. 244 Some residents also remain skeptical of the Alexander Company's promises that the Novation Campus will
bring them new jobs and tax revenues.2 45
In light of these concerns, residents of Drumlin Farms and the Southdale
Neighborhood attempted to negotiate a community benefits agreement2 46
with the Alexander Company to ensure that existing residents receive actual benefits from the redevelopment, such as affordable housing, job creation, and preserved community gardens, rather than promised, but not realized, benefits.2 47 Residents told the Dane County Zoning Commission
("Zoning Commission") that they would provide support for the project if
an agreement on community benefits could be reached.24 8 The Zoning
Commission did not facilitate the creation of a community benefits agreement, but in response to the residents' request, the Zoning Commission
added an "amendment to the zoning petition" that required the Alexander
Company to take "a more active role in meeting with the neighborhood. 2 49
However, the residents and developer did not create a formal contract
promising community benefits. 250 The Alexander Company maintains that
the Novation Campus will create significant jobs for area residents,2 51 but
the lack of a contract or formal agreement to enforce such promises may
mean that such benefits do not actually accrue to existing residents.
The Alexander Company did, however, respond to community concerns
by sending representatives door-to-door to inform "residents about [the]
upcoming construction." 252 Forced in part by the City of Fitchburg's requirement that development projects cannot commence without a neighborhood plan, the Alexander Company did, in conjunction with the Town
of Madison, help to create a neighborhood plan.253 Some argue that Southdale and Drumlin Farms residents were not an integral part of the develop244. See id. (explaining that low-income residents are being pushed out).
245. See id.; Goldsby Interview, supra note 240.
246. See Julian Gross, Community Benefits Agreements, in BUILDING HEALTHY COMMUNITIES: A GUIDE TO COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT FOR ADVOCATES, LAWYERS AND POLICYMAKERS 189-204 (Roger A. Clay, Jr. & Susan R. Jones eds., 2009) (defining "community bene-

fits agreements" as a "legally binding, private contract between a developer and communitybased organizations, under which the developer commits to providing specified community
benefits through a proposed development project, and participating community groups agree
to support the project in the governmental approval process").
247. See Kratz, supra note 220.
248. See id.
249. See id.
250. See id.
251. See id.
252. Id.
253. See id.
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ment of the Southdale Neighborhood Plan (the "Southdale Plan"), and that
the Town of Madison allowed the Alexander Company undue influence by
permitting the Company to hire its own consultant to produce the Neighborhood Plan. 254 Some residents stated, "Alexander was really in charge of
the planning process," and noted that "the original version of the plan left
255 While the Alexander Company did
out affordable housing and transit."
hold several public meetings with neighborhood residents in 2007 and
2008, when the Fitchburg Plan Commission held a meeting to approve the
Southdale Plan on December 2, 2008, eighty residents showed up mostly in
256
The Southdale Neighborhood
support of retaining Drumlin as a farm.
Plan was ultimately approved by the Zoning Commission "with language
urging that a community garden remain in Southdale" and recognizing that
25 7 However, the
the Drumlin Farms was part of neighborhood resources.
at the
Plan did not provide that the community gardens would remain
258
gardens.
the
for
location
new
a
Drumlin site, nor did it suggest
The Southdale Springs Cooperative Housing Conceptual Plan
Many residents argue, however, that given the significant investment of
public dollars through TIF financing in the Novation Campus, the Novation
259
GivCampus should contain more public benefits for existing residents.
benefits
community
of
lack
en their concerns about the Novation Campus's
for existing residents, some residents of the Drumlin Farms and Southdale
Neighborhoods sought to develop an alternative plan for the Drumlin
Farms site.260 The Southdale Neighborhood Association enlisted Constructive Change Consulting LLC, a company owned by Michael Goldsby.
Goldsby is a local African-American consultant and a member of the
Drumlin Farm Cooperative, who provides consulting on TID and TIF struc261 The Southdale Springs Cooptures as well as sustainable development.
erative Housing Conceptual Plan (the "Southdale Springs Plan") is envisioned on an 8.05 acre parcel located on the site of the former Drumlin
Farms, which is now owned by the Alexander Company and is slated for
redevelopment on the Novation Campus. However, the Southdale Springs
3.

254. See id.
255. Id.
256. See id.
257. Id.
258. See id.
259. See id.; Goldsby Interview, supra note 240.
260. See Kratz, supra note 220.
ConsultingLLC, LINKEDIN,
261. See Michael Goldsby, Presidentat Constructive Change
4
http://www.linkedin.com/pub/michael-goldsby/15/562/5 (last visited Mar. 1, 2011).
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Cooperative Housing Plan is an alternative plan for the site, which attempts
to retain some of the positive sustainable and communal features of the
original Drumlin Farms site and gives existing Southdale residents more
control over the scope of the redevelopment.
Figure 1. The Southdale Springs Plan.26 2

..........

.. .....
.......

The Southdale Springs Plan would retain 1.05 acres of community organic gardens on the former Drumlin Farms site. 263 It would also reserve
1.62 acres of land on the site for cooperative farming facilities that would
produce organic produce. 264 On the same site, within walking distance of
the cooperative farms and community gardens, the plan would include a
restaurant that utilizes the organic produce from the farm. 265 The restaurant
would be located in a historic house on the site. 266 The site would also contain space for small businesses such as coffee houses and other retail.26 7
The idea is that local residents who receive job-training in sustainable urban agriculture and entrepreneurship could staff the small businesses on the
site.268 Most importantly, 2.7 acres of the Southdale Springs Plan would be
262. EDWARD KUHARSKi, SOUTHDALE SPRINGS COOPERATIVE HOUSING CONCEPTUAL
PLANNING STUDY ScHEME A (2010) (on file with author).
263. See id.

264. See id.
265.
266.
267.
268.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See Goldsby Interview, supra note 240.
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reserved for affordable housing that retains the affordability of the housing
over the long-term. 26 9 The housing structures include twenty-six units of
affordable cooperative housing that would serve approximately forty-four
residents, as well as some homeownership opportunities that would use a
co-housing model, or some other form of long-term, affordable, community-based housing, such as single family housing on a community land trust
2.5 acres for a neighborhood park
structure. 27 ° The site would also reserve
27 1
trails.
walking
as
well
as
and preserve
Michael Goldsby, as a consultant to the Southdale Neighborhood Association, attempted to have the Southdale Springs Plan incorporated into
CARPC's application to HUD for the Sustainable Communities Planning
Grant Program. Goldsby contends that the Southdale Springs Plan's attempt to integrate resident-owned and controlled, long-term, affordable
housing with preservation of green space, cooperatively owned organic
farming, community gardens, and sustainable small businesses makes the
Southdale Springs Plan consistent with the social equity and sustainability
goals of the Grant Program. 272 Goldsby is also hopeful that the Southdale
Springs Plan could dovetail with the efforts of Growing Power, Inc. and
273 The
Will Allen to create a sustainable school and urban agricultural site.
Southdale Springs Plan site is also located near major highways and is near
high-speed rail system between Madison
a possible site for the proposed
274
and Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
However, despite Goldsby's efforts, CARPC and those developing the
Madsion, Wisconsin/Dane County application to HUD's Grant Program
elected not to work with Goldsby to implement the Southdale Springs Plan.
Admittedly, there are several legitimate reasons that CARPC could have
elected not to work with Goldsby and the architects of the Southdale
Springs Plan. CARPC may have felt the Local Food Market Business Plan
was easier to administer or more apt for the scope of the Grant Program,
which is a three year planning grant.275 CARPC may have also had more

269. See KUHARSKI, supra note 263.
270. See id.; see also Goldsby Interview, supra note 240.
271. See KuHARSKi, supra note 263.
272. See Goldsby Interview, supra note 240.
273. See id.
274. As of the writing of this Article, Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker has rejected the
federal money granted to be used for the high-speed rail project linking Milwaukee, Wisconsin to Madison, Wisconsin. See Jason Plautz, Obama Admin Threatens to Take Back
9
/
Wis. Rail Money, N.Y. TimEs, Nov 9, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/ll/0
73 3
0 .html.
09greenwire-obama-admin-threatens-to-take-back-wis-rail-mo-8
275. See Telephone Interview with Paul Finch, Legal Consultant to Michael Goldsby
(Aug. 23, 2010).
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confidence in the collaboration that would implement and administer the
Local Fresh Food Market idea because of their track record of experience
and success. CARPC may have also rendered the Southdale Springs Plan
unrealistic because its organizers did not have site control and were in conflict with the Alexander Company which did have site control and paid
large sums for the site. 276 CARPC may also have had less confidence in
the grassroots community group's ability to effectuate their stated plans
and steward the plan over the long-term. Lastly, personality conflicts may
have been one of the reasons that CARPC elected not to work with Goldsby to implement the Southdale Springs Plan.
Yet, it is significant that an idea that is completely consistent with the
long-term social equity goals of the Grant Program did not receive funding
and was excluded from the process of consortium creation in this case.
While the Local Fresh Food Market will undeniably reap multiple benefits
for the neighborhood, and perhaps even serve a broader group than the
Southdale Springs Plan, the Local Fresh Food Market does not guarantee
that the residents of Drumlin Farms or the Southdale neighborhood will receive affordable housing, jobs, or control over the long-term scope of development in the area. CARPC does have other aspects of its plan that are
designed to advance these goals, but it is not clear that those benefits will
accrue to the existing residents of Southdale as many residents of Southdale
apparently hoped. Further, many residents of Southdale claim that their
elected representatives failed to adequately express their long-term needs in
the process of neighborhood planning, or in their struggles to have greater,
enforceable community benefits result from the Novation Campus redeve2 77
lopment project.
While it appears that CARPC has selected social equity partners that are
demographically and ideologically aligned with low-income minority and
underserved groups, it is not clear that those representatives will assert the
distributive outcomes in the planning process that some Southdale residents
hoped for. This is not to suggest that the selected social equity or catalytic
project partners will intentionally or even opportunistically undermine the
interests of traditionally marginalized groups. However, it seems likely
that, in the instance of the struggle for the soul of Southdale, the representatives of marginalized stakeholders' interests selected by CARPC may accept a framing of the Novation Campus project as "in the long-term interests of Southdale residents," even if the campus creation sets in motion

276. See Kratz, supra note 220.
277. See id.
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processes of gentrification that ultimately displace, rather than empower,
existing Southdale residents.
CONCLUSION

The Sustainable Communities Regional Planning Grant Program's embrace of voluntary, regional public/private collaborations to advance regional equity has potential promise and perils. The present staff at HUD
seems quite committed to working with regional collaborators to advance
regional equity and mitigate possible risks. As such, the Grant Program is
very promising. The case of Madison, Wisconsin can be characterized as
one anecdote that may not be representative of the dynamics occurring
across the country. It could also be dismissed as "much ado about nothing, 278 since the selected representatives of marginalized groups in
CARPC's plan seem well-qualified to advance equity for traditionally underrepresented groups. Yet, the narrative does reveal possible limitations
in the Grant Program's institutional design. The most aggressive solutions
to promote regional equity, or advance the interests of traditionally marginalized groups, may be excluded, sublimated, or omitted in the process of
consortium creation. The most marginalized or grassroots groups may not
have the capacity to be selected as consortium participants, yet they may
have important perspectives on how to advance equity within the region.
Further, the Grant Program does not contain mechanisms to gather the
kind of qualitative data or information that HUD would need to understand
whether or not power is operating to undermine regional equity or disempower marginalized constituents in the process of consortium creation. It
also remains unclear how marginalized groups who are selected to be part
of the consortium effort might communicate their concerns about the planning process to HUD, since the lead applicant is the main point of contact
for the Grant Program. The Grant Program also does not contain an administrative process through which other consortium members can hold the
lead applicant accountable, if they feel that their interests are not adequately respected in the regional planning process. Thus, similar stories or power struggles could be occurring in the process of consortium development
in other regions, but the Grant Program is not designed to capture those occurrences.
Additionally, the Grant Program does not mandate the participation of
certain traditionally underserved or marginalized groups, or their represent-

278. See generally WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING (Sheldon P.

Zitner ed., Oxford Univ. Press, 1993) (infamous comedic play describing a situation in
which a great fuss was made about matters that were in fact insignificant).
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atives, in its threshold requirements for the Grant Program. It incentivizes
applicants to include such groups, but it does not require them to do so.
Consequently, a program may contain equitable elements on paper, but fail
to retain those elements over the long-haul implementation stage. This is
more likely if private interests are a substantial part of the plan. The Grant
Program's focus on groups that have technical capacity and experience, and
who can leverage funds, may mean that the most grassroots or politically
active groups that represent traditionally underserved constituents may not
be selected. While the Grant Program provides technical assistance funding to its grantees, little financial technical assistance was provided to help
more inexperienced groups prepare for the application process.
These concerns outline only a few of the possible pitfalls for the Grant
Program. While the Grant Program is promising, its penchant for voluntary
and contractual regional collaboration may cause it to suffer from the longstanding criticisms of new governance in practice. Perhaps more participatory and outcome requirements; more mechanisms through which marginalized groups can express their concerns with the process of consortium
formation or deliberation; more money for technical assistance, among other protections; can be incorporated into future voluntary, regional, problemsolving programs. Including protections of this kind may help the regional
problem solving networks remain accountable to the public law values of
equity and inclusion that continue to elude traditional local government law
structures.

